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POLICIES OF INEQUITY — A WORLD APART:  A 
COMPARISON OF THE POLICIES TOWARD INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES OF A POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPING NATION 
TO THOSE OF A POST-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPED NATION 
Caitlain Devereaux Lewis* 
I. Introduction 
A people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found 
by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an 
ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, 
our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands . . . , until they 
retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is 
deemed necessary to their comfortable subsistence.1 
Federal Indian law is rooted in a history of conquest and colonization.  
Indeed, theories of conquest2 and discovery3 rights are the foundation of 
                                                                                                                 
 * Law Clerk, United States Court of International Trade.  B.S., Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute; M.S., University at Albany; J.D., Albany Law School.  Editor-in-
Chief, Albany Law Review, 2010–2011.  The views expressed in this article are solely those 
of the author.   
The author wishes to thank Professor Robert C. Batson, Government Lawyer in 
Residence at the Government Law Center of Albany Law School, whose Federal Indian Law 
course inspired this article, and her parents, George T. Lewis and Linda Embser Lewis, who 
showed her the entire world in extraordinary detail. 
 1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). 
 2. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959) (“Through conquest and 
treaties [the Indian tribes] were induced to give up complete independence and the right to 
go to war in exchange for federal protection, aid, and grants of land.”); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians 
v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) (“After conquest [the tribes] were permitted to 
occupy portions of territory over which they had previously exercised ‘sovereignty’ . . . . 
This is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy . . . . This position of the 
Indian has long been rationalized by the legal theory that discovery and conquest gave the 
conquerors sovereignty over and ownership of the lands thus obtained.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515, 543–44 (1832) (“To avoid 
bloody conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to all, it was necessary for the nations 
of Europe to establish some principle which all would acknowledge, and which should 
decide their respective rights as between themselves.  This principle, suggested by the actual 
state of things, was, ‘that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects or by 
whose authority it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be 
consummated by possession.’” (quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 543, 573 
(1823))); Worcester, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 543–44 (“This principle, acknowledged by all 
Europeans . . . gave to the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the 
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many of the early Federal Indian law decisions that still serve as precedent 
for cases decided today.4  This body of law evolved out of what is known as 
the “classic phase”5 of colonization when “colonial contact metamorphosed 
over time into the successful full-scale implantation of Western society on 
extra-European soil.”6  Many comparative studies of the legal regimes 
governing indigenous peoples that evolved out of this classic phase of 
colonization have been conducted, especially those comparing the policies 
of common law countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States.7  
Yet, the classic phase is not the only model of colonization.  Indeed, 
“[s]tate conquest and incorporation have happened in diverse places to 
millions of indigenous people over the past few centuries.  The process has 
many histories.  But as different as these histories are, they seem to share 
certain features.”8  For example, “[i]t [is] evident in looking beyond the 
reservation system in the United States that . . . power relationships are not 
unique to Native American communities.  Similar patterns shape the 
experience of other indigenous peoples in different state systems.”9   
An interesting comparison can be made between the governing systems 
affecting Native Americans and those of post-colonial, developing nations.  
                                                                                                                 
sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements on it.”); Johnson, 21 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) at 584 (“Thus, all the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this 
continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognized in others, the exclusive right of 
the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 470 U.S. 226, 234 
(1985) (“The ‘doctrine of discovery’ provided . . . that discovering nations held fee title to 
these lands, subject to the Indians’ right of occupancy and use.  As a consequence, no one 
could purchase Indian land or otherwise terminate aboriginal title without the consent of the 
sovereign.” (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida (Oneida I), 414 U.S. 661, 667 
(1974))). 
 5. MAIVÂN CLECH LÂM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 14 (2000) (“The classic phase of this at first European enterprise . . . may 
be said to run from Columbus’ arrival in the New World in 1492 to the General Assembly 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960.  
Victims in the classic phase included peoples who had already constituted themselves into 
centralized nations at the time of contact with the West as well as others who, while 
organized on a subsistence basis, occupied territories that were accessible to Western 
intruders.”).   
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PERRY, FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND 
STATE SYSTEMS xiii (1996) (listing examples of such comparative studies and stating that 
“[a] number of studies already have drawn some limited comparisons, especially between 
Canada or the United States and Australia”). 
 8. Id. at xi. 
 9. Id. at xiii. 
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Such developing nations are governed by the predominant indigenous 
groups that inherited power from former colonizing powers, usually 
European, when they relinquished control over their colonies.  While these 
governments are composed of the predominant indigenous groups, there is 
often a subset of disfavored or minority indigenous people who are then 
governed by the indigenous peoples favored by the colonizing power.  
Thus, a comparison between the policies of post-industrial, developed 
nations toward their indigenous peoples, such as those embodied in Federal 
Indian law, and the policies of post-colonial, developing nations, serves as 
an interesting study in power relationships, ethnic tension, and legal 
justifications.  Surprisingly, 
[m]any so-called Third World states, which themselves had 
experienced colonization, seem to repeat the action of earlier 
European states in their own policies toward indigenous 
peoples . . . . “Territorial consolidation, national integration, the 
imperatives of population growth, and economic development 
are phrases used by Third World states to cover up the killing of 
indigenous nations and peoples.”10 
This article examines the policies of one post-colonial, developing 
nation, the Republic of Indonesia, toward its minority indigenous 
populations.  As in Federal Indian law, which “is a subject that cannot be 
understood if the historical dimension of existing law is ignored,”11 these 
policies are best understood within their historical context.  To this end, this 
article is arranged chronologically and begins by briefly outlining contact 
with the indigenous peoples of West Papua during the colonial era. It will 
then provide an examination of the Indonesian government’s policies 
toward West Papua during the infancy of the Republic: the “Irian Jaya” era. 
Finally, this article will examine the most recent policies of the twenty-first 
century that evolved in reaction to separatist sentiment.  In the process, the 
article will draw comparisons to the policies of Federal Indian law in order 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. at 203 (quoting Bernard Nietschmann, Third World Colonial Expansion: 
Indonesia, Disguised Invasion of Indigenous Nations, in TRIBAL PEOPLES AND DEVELOPMENT 
ISSUES: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW 191, 192 (John H. Bodley ed., 1988)). 
 11. Nathan R. Margold, Introduction, in Felix COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW xxvii (Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942); see also South Carolina v. Catawba 
Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 511–12 (1986) (Blackmon, J., dissenting) (“Even more than 
other domains of law, ‘the intricacies and peculiarities of Indian law deman[d] an 
appreciation of history.’” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, A Jurisprudential 
Symposium in Memory of Felix S. Cohen, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 356 (1954))). 
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to make observations about how the policies of post-colonial, developing 
nations toward their indigenous peoples correspond to and differ from those 
of post-industrial developed nations, such as the United States. 
A. The Republic of Indonesia and the Island of Papua:  An Overview of the 
Population and Geography 
With a population of over two hundred million, Indonesia is the world’s 
fourth most populous nation.12  Composed of over 17,000 islands, it is also 
the world’s largest archipelago,13 and “[s]pread out over these many islands 
are literally hundreds of spoken dialects and cultural sub-groups.”14  Of the 
islands, West Papua, Kalimantan, and Sumatra are the largest, and are 
among the five largest islands in the world.15  West Papua is the western 
half of the island of New Guinea.  The island of New Guinea is “the most 
culturally diverse place on earth.  This one island harbors nearly a thousand 
distinct languages and cultures — one-fifth of the world’s total.”16  While 
West Papua is part of Indonesia, the eastern part of the island was formerly 
held by Australia and is now the independent nation of Papua New 
Guinea.17   
West Papua18 was previously known as Netherlands New Guinea (up 
until 1962), West Irian (from 1962 to 1973), and Irian Jaya (from 1973 to 
2001), but was renamed West Papua in 2001.19  West Papua is considered a 
province of Indonesia and is “‘roughly the size of France, has a population 
under two million in a country of over two hundred million, and its capital, 
Jayapura, is some 3500 kilometers (2100 miles) from the Indonesian capital 
[of] Jakarta.’”20  It is also “the most resource-rich region of the Indonesian 
archipelago, yet most of its native population lives in abject poverty.”21 
                                                                                                                 
 12. INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK: REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 2 (Sawyer Miller 
Consulting 1997) [hereinafter INDONESIA: COUNTRY BRIEFING BOOK]. 
 13. Id.  
 14. ADAM SCHWARZ, A NATION IN WAITING: INDONESIA IN THE 1990S, at 6 (1994). 
 15. Id. 
 16. ART DAVIDSON, ENDANGERED PEOPLES 172 (1993). 
 17. DATUS C. SMITH, JR., THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF INDONESIA 8 (rev. ed. 1983). 
 18. This article will refer to the Indonesian part of the island of New Guinea as “West 
Papua” and its peoples as “West Papuans,” unless use of one of the former names within its 
historical context is appropriate.  “Papua New Guinea” will refer to the independent nation 
on the eastern part of the island.   
 19. Diana Glazebrook, “If I Stay Here There Is Nothing yet If I Return I Do Not Know 
Whether I Will Be Safe”: West Papuan Refugee Responses to Papua New Guinea Asylum 
Policy 1998–2003, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 205, 206 (2004).   
 20. Amber Dufseth, Comment, Indonesia’s 1999 Political Laws: The Right of 
Association in Aceh and Papua, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 613, 624 (2002) (quoting HUMAN 
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B. Tribes of Papua 
West Papua is home to approximately 312 tribes, some of which have 
yet to be contacted.22  Among the better known of these tribes are the 
Amungme, Asmat, Dani, and Moi.23  Interestingly, the Dani were not 
“discovered” by westerners until 1938.24  The indigenous population of 
West Papua is comprised of approximately one million people, and consists 
of “hundreds of distinct societies and languages.”25  Most of these people 
live “in villages and hamlets linked by ties of trade, ceremonial exchange, 
marriage, and intermittent small-scale conflicts.”26  The “central 
mountainous region of Papua is home to the highland peoples, who practice 
pig husbandry and sweet potato cultivation,” and the “lowland peoples live 
in swampy and malarial coastal regions, and live by hunting the abundant 
game, and gathering.”27  While some of the hundreds of Papuan tribal 
languages are related to one another, others are entirely unique.28  The 
indigenous Papuan groups are all “ethnically distinct from the Indonesians 
who control their country,”29 and they have “no history of any large-scale 
overall political organization that united more than a few groups.”30 
C. History of the Area 
Like those of Federal Indian law, the policies of Indonesia toward its 
indigenous peoples can only be understood with “an appreciation of 
history,”31 therefore a brief historical overview is necessary. 
The Dutch arrived in the Indonesian islands early in the seventeenth 
century and by 1602 had established the Dutch East India Company.32  
                                                                                                                 
RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRO-INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN PAPUA, 1999–2000, at 
2 (2000)). 
 21. Correspondent’s Diary, Cursed by Plenty: Paying a Covert Visit to Papua’s 
Fighters in the Forest, ECONOMIST (July 8, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/1652 
4650. 
 22. Papuan Tribes, SURVIVAL INT’L, http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/Papuan 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 23. See DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 171–78. 
 24. See Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21. 
 25. PERRY, supra note 7, at 205. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Papuan Tribes, supra note 22. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. PERRY, supra note 7, at 205. 
 31. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 511 (1986) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting).  
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Contact with the island of New Guinea, however, was minimal.  Indeed, it 
was not until 1848 that “the powers of Holland and Britain artificially 
divided the island at the 141st meridian.”33  This dividing line between the 
sovereign nation of Papua New Guinea and the Indonesian province of 
West Papua remains today.   
Foreign activity on the island climaxed during the Second World War.  
Indeed, in 1944 General Douglas MacArthur made his headquarters in West 
Papua and “[f]rom a mountaintop near what was then the Dutch colonial 
town of Hollandia he planned America’s recapture of the Philippines from 
Japanese occupation.”34  While Indonesia remained under Dutch rule at the 
onset of World War II, Japan occupied the country from 1942 to 1945.35  
When the Japanese withdrew at the end of the war, Indonesia, under the 
guidance of President Sukarno,36 the first president of Indonesia, declared 
its independence in order to prevent Holland from reentering.   
The 1949 transfer of sovereignty formalized Indonesia’s independence, 
but “left the determination of the fate of West Papua to later negotiations.”37  
In the interim, Holland continued to hold the area, “but Indonesia pressed 
its claim in the United Nations . . . and elsewhere”38and the Dutch 
administration in West Papua endeavored “‘to create conditions for the self-
determination of a population.’”39  To this end,  
[u]nder Dutch tutelage the West Papuan New Guinea Council 
(partly elected parliament) was installed in 1961 by almost 
universal suffrage.  Political parties and trade unions were 
formed, public service positions were increasingly filled by 
                                                                                                                 
 32. M.C. RICKLEFS, A HISTORY OF MODERN INDONESIA SINCE C.1300, at 27 (2d ed. 
1993).  In the Dutch language, the Dutch East India Company is known as Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie or VOC, which translates to the “United East India Company.”  Id. at 
xviii. 
 33. DENISE LEITH, THE POLITICS OF POWER: FREEPORT IN SUHARTO’S INDONESIA 10 
(2003). 
 34. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21. 
 35. SUDARGO GAUTAMA & ROBERT N. HORNICK, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDONESIAN 
LAW: UNITY IN DIVERSITY 181 (rev. ed. 1974). 
 36. There are two conventions for spelling Indonesian names, the Dutch and the 
English.  Using the Dutch spelling, Sukarno is spelled “Soekarno,” while Suharto is spelled 
“Soeharto.”  For purposes of this article, the English spellings of Indonesian names (i.e., 
Jakarta, Sukarno, and Suharto) will be used, except in quoted material. 
 37. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119. 
 38. SMITH, supra note 17, at 8. 
 39. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119 (citing A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION 7 (1973)). 
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Papuans, and a plan was launched to place West New Guinea 
under United Nations control pending independence.  Finally, a 
Papuan crest, national anthem, and flag (the Morning Star) were 
introduced and the western half officially renamed West Papua.40   
In some ways, this period is reminiscent of a brief period in Federal Indian 
law, the Indian New Deal era from the late 1920s to the 1940s, when tribes 
were provided with tools to become self-sufficient, both economically and 
culturally.41  Like the brief Indian New Deal period, the West Papuan 
experience with independence was fleeting. 
 West Papua enjoyed independence during a ten-month period from 1961 
to 1962,42 but President Sukarno “responded by declaring a campaign of 
total mobilization to wrest Netherland’s New Guinea from the Dutch.”43  
Indonesia viewed “the continuing Dutch presence as the prolongation of 
colonialism” and “nothing other than a desperate Dutch ploy to leave in 
place a regime favorable to the Netherlands and hostile to Djakarta.”44 
Coincidentally, it was Indonesia’s second president, Suharto, who was 
charged with planning and carrying out Sukarno’s military campaign;45 
however, the “forces available to [Suharto] were appallingly ill prepared, 
his initial losses were high, and he was saved from having to launch the 
invasion Sukarno wanted by the intervention of the United States.”46 
  The impasse between Indonesia and the Netherlands ended in 1962 
when the Netherlands entered into the “New York Agreement” which was 
mediated by the United States.47  Under this Agreement, the “Dutch would 
leave West Papua and transfer sovereignty to the United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority . . . for a period of [six] years.”48  Under 
                                                                                                                 
 40. LEITH, supra note 33, at 11. 
 41. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1339 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
Lexis Nexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN]. 
 42. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21. 
 43. Glazebrook, supra note 19, at 206. 
 44. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119. 
 45. See JOHN BRESNAN, MANAGING INDONESIA: THE MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 47 
(1993). 
 46. Id. 
 47. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120. 
 48. 145 CONG. REC. H9197 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1999) (statement of Del. Eni 
Faleomavaega) [hereinafter Statement of Del. Faleomavaega]; see also Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, 
New Era for Free Papua Movement, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 3, 1998, at 4 (“After five months 
of talks . . . Indonesian and Dutch negotiators signed ‘the Agreement between the Republic 
of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Concerning West New Guinea (West 
Irian)’ at the UN headquarters in New York on Aug. 15, 1962.  Under the New York 
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the supervision of the United Nations, Indonesia agreed to then “allow 
[West Papua’s] inhabitants to engage in an act of self-determination 
regarding its political status by no later than 1969.”49  This plebiscite later 
became known as the “Act of Free Choice.”50  Interestingly, although “their 
fate was to be decided at the United Nations, the West Papuans were never 
heard from by that body.  The discussions of West Papua’s self-
determination engaged states only, including highly interested ones, but not 
the people centrally affected.”51   
The “Act of Free Choice” was to “be held in 1968 to determine whether 
the inhabitants desired to be a part of Indonesia.”52  However, “Indonesia 
orchestrated an election that many regarded as a brutal military operation.  
In what came to be known as an ‘act of no-choice,’ . . . 1025 elders under 
heavy military surveillance were selected to vote on behalf of 809,327 West 
Papuans on the territory’s political status.”53  The United Nations (“UN”) 
“simply noted that irregularities had occurred and went on to validate 
Indonesia’s extension of sovereignty over West Papua.”54  The UN sent 
Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz to observe the plebiscite55 to ensure it was 
conducted in accordance with international practices.56  Ambassador Ortiz-
Sanz issued the following statement: 
I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the 
implementation of article XXII of the Agreement relating to the 
rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement 
and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area.  In spite of my 
constant efforts, this important provision was not fully 
                                                                                                                 
agreement, the Netherlands transferred the administration of the territory to a United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) on Oct. 1, 1962, and then after May 1, 1963, the 
UNTEA and Indonesia jointly administered the territory.  A transitional period followed in 
the history of Irian Jaya until 1969, when the Act of Free Choice was held.”). 
 49. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120. 
 50. See generally JOHN SALTFORD, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INDONESIAN 
TAKEOVER OF WEST PAPUA, 1962–1969: THE ANATOMY OF BETRAYAL (2006).  
 51. LÂM, supra note 5, at 119–20. 
 52. Dufseth, supra note 20, at 624. 
 53. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48. 
 54. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120 (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF 
PEOPLES 84–86 (1995)). 
 55. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48. 
 56. LÂM, supra note 5, at 120 (citing CASSESE, supra note 54, at 84). 
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implemented and the Indonesian administration exercised at all 
times a tight political control over the population.57   
The United States also expressed concern about the process.58  Soon after 
the “closely orchestrated vote, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi 
Papua Merdeka or ‘OPM’) formed with a core of 200 fighters and began a 
low-intensity insurgency.”59  In response to the OPM’s activities, in 1969 
Indonesia declared Papua an “Operational Military Zone.”  For this reason, 
“the OPM has ‘never coalesced into the united or organized form its name 
implies.’”60 
After Indonesia took control of West Papua,  
the next six years of military rule systematically dismantled the 
symbols of West Papuan sovereignty: the West Papuan police 
were confined to barracks; all political groups were disbanded; 
the use of national symbols, including the words “Papuan” and 
“Melanesian,” were outlawed; public gatherings of any kind 
became illegal; freedom of movement and speech were denied, 
and the Papuan education system was destroyed.61   
While Sukarno’s leadership initiated a “struggle to establish an 
ideological basis for the Indonesian state, and the military’s evolving role 
within the leadership of that state,”62 Suharto perfected this struggle by the 
time West Papua became part of Indonesia.  As the first Indonesian 
president to control West Papua, coupled with his thirty-two year tenure, 
Suharto had the greatest impact upon the policies of Indonesia toward West 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48. 
 58. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21 (“Official documents released by America’s 
National Security Archive in Washington, DC, reveal what the Americans were thinking at 
the time.  They knew perfectly well that there was no element of free choice in the Act of 
Free Choice.  In July 1969 the American embassy in Jakarta sent a confidential cable to 
Washington saying that the Act of Free Choice was unfolding ‘like a Greek tragedy, the 
conclusion preordained.’  Jakarta could and would not permit any resolution other than the 
inclusion of Papua into Indonesia, the memo stated.  America’s ambassador offered an 
estimate: as many as 85–90% of all Papuans favoured independence.  But, this being the 
height of the Vietnam war, the Americans saw Indonesia as an indispensable ally in the 
region.”). 
 59. Dufseth, supra note 20, at 624 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 6). 
 60. Id. 
 61. LEITH, supra note 33, at 12. 
 62. SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 6. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
432 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
 
 
Papua.63  For this reason, a discussion of Suharto’s policies will constitute 
the bulk of this article.  After three decades under Suharto’s military 
control, however, West Papua then experienced a number of short-term 
presidents who brought in a new era of reform.64 
II. Policies During the Colonial Era: 
“Netherlands New Guinea” (1895–1962) 
 
Just as the colonial period in the United States served as the basis of 
Federal Indian law, so too did the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia set the 
stage for the development of Indonesia’s policies toward the indigenous 
peoples of West Papua.  This is especially true in legal policies governing 
ethnic divisions, natural resources management, economic development, 
and transmigration policies.   
A. Ethnic Division 
In terms of ethnic divisions, “[f]rom the earliest days of Dutch 
colonization, inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago have been divided 
for legal purposes into various ‘population groups’ . . . based primarily on 
racial origin.”65  These divisions determined the 
kinds of contracts one might enter into and in what form, 
whether one could own land and where, from whom one could 
inherit wealth and in what ways. . . . This was so because distinct 
rules of contract law, of property law, of inheritance law existed 
for each group.66 
Therefore, each population group “had what amounted to its own legal 
system — separate regulations administered by separate government 
officials and enforced in separate course of law.”67   
Dutch colonial masters may have had a number of different motives for 
dividing the population of the Indonesian islands along ethnic lines.  
“Whatever the original motives, the division of colonial society into 
population groups has survived the transfer of sovereignty, and citizens of 
                                                                                                                 
 63. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH & ADVOCACY, 
IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD BANK IN INDONESIA 35 
(1995) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMM.]. 
 64. See infra Part V. 
 65. GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 35, at 1. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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independent Indonesia, especially in matters of civil and commercial law, 
are often subject to separate regulations depending on which population 
group they belong to.”68  This is particularly true for the people of West 
Papua, who were subjected to aggressive assimilationist policies under 
Suharto.69   
B. Exploitation of Natural Resources 
The Dutch colonial period also emphasized the exploitation of natural 
resources.  In fact, the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian islands early in the 
seventeenth century in search of riches, and by 1602 had established the 
Dutch East India Company.70  Thus, the colonization of Indonesia began as 
a commercial endeavor to exploit the spice wealth of the Indonesian 
islands, and only later did it become a nationalized colony.71  Indeed, “[n]ot 
until the 1930s did the Europeans venture into [Papua’s] mountainous 
interior.  They went looking for gold, and unexpectedly discovered a lost 
world — millions of tribal people living a Stone Age life in the twentieth 
century.”72   
As is the case with many indigenous peoples around the world, the 
Papuans are cursed with an abundance of natural resources, as they inhabit 
“the most resource-rich region of the Indonesian archipelago.”73  
Predictably, exploitation of these natural resources in the name of economic 
development greatly influenced the policies implemented under President 
Suharto.74  This is quite similar to the plight of many Native American 
tribes; indeed, 
[s]ome [thirty] tribes in the United States . . . own roughly one-
third of the surface-accessible coal west of the Mississippi as 
well as 15% of all coal reserves, 40% of all uranium ore, and 4% 
of all oil found in the country.  Not that these figures translate 
into wealth for the concerned tribes.75   
While exploitation of natural resources was part and parcel of the 
European colonial enterprise, surprisingly “it is not clear that the leaders of 
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the independence movements in [Asia and Africa] saw anything 
fundamentally wrong with the export-oriented economies that they 
inherited from the West.”76  Alarmingly, “the social dislocation, 
environmental degradation, cultural alienation, wealth differentiation, and 
militarization that ‘going global’ produced in the Third World after 
independence surpass in scale anything seen in colonial times.”77   
This new model, called “neo-colonialism,” is characterized by 
“externally controlled but internally mediated colonialism,” and has proven 
“particularly threatening to indigenous and tribal peoples.”78  This results 
from the dependency on a large supply of natural resources for intense 
economic development, which has been the focus of many post-colonial, 
developing countries. Inevitably, “[a]s raw materials for the industrial 
economy ran out in accessible places, they had to be sought out in formerly 
inaccessible ones, where the world’s remaining unassimilated peoples 
live.”79 
C. Transmigration 
Transmigration is another major Dutch colonial policy that influenced 
Indonesian policies toward West Papua, and was a core part of Suharto’s 
social and developmental policies.80 Transmigration in many ways mirrors 
the policies of the United States during the Removal Era,81 from the 1820s 
to the 1840s.  “Transmigration was first introduced by the Dutch in 1905 
when they moved impoverished Javanese peasants to the less-populated 
areas to supposedly allow them to start a new life.  In reality they 
represented a supply of cheap labor to foreign-owned plantations.”82  
Suharto’s transmigration policies extended the Dutch policies into the post-
colonial era, with transmigrants providing a supply of cheap labor to 
support foreign investment in the nascent country.83 
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III. Policies During the Infancy of the Indonesian Republic Under President 
Sukarno: “West Irian” (1962–1967) 
Generally speaking, “Indonesian law is a remarkably complex mixture of 
Dutch legislation, uniquely indigenous institutions and Islamic 
commandments.”84  In some ways, Federal Indian law parallels Indonesian 
law with its various sources, such as the common law inherited from the 
Anglo tradition, federal statutory law, and tribal law and constitutions.   
While “Indonesia is the site of long-standing, diverse efforts to shape 
lives in an Islamic way,” an important and unique aspect of Indonesian law 
is the “local complexes of norms and traditions called adat, some 300-plus 
of them according to conventional calculations.”85  While the impact of 
adat is well documented, it is important to note that only certain aspects of 
adat, that of the predominant ethnic groups such as the Javanese, figure into 
Indonesian law in any major way.86  Throughout its legal history,  
Indonesians have been trying to work out ways to reconcile th[e] 
normative florescence [of adat], and to do so within resolutely 
centralizing forms of state rule, under the Dutch, under the 
democracy, real and then “guided,” of the first president, 
Sukarno, . . . and now, under what looks increasingly like  
“unguided chaos” under a succession of short-term presidents.87 
Given this diversity of legal influences, coupled with “literally hundreds of 
spoken dialects and cultural sub-groups,”88 it is “[l]ittle wonder, then, that 
maintaining national unity has been the one constant preoccupation of all of 
Indonesia’s leaders.”89  As will be demonstrated, the overemphasis on 
centralization, assimilation, and integration of the Indonesian Republic has 
had devastating effects on minority indigenous groups such as the West 
Papuans. 
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A. Adoption of the Constitution and Establishment of Early Laws 
The Indonesian Constitution was initially adopted in 1945 and was 
“drafted hastily to declare independence, in the wake of the retreating 
Japanese occupation forces and in anticipation of the returning Dutch.”90  
While the Constitution has been amended a number of times, this founding 
document “embodied the concept of a single nation and gave little 
recognition to ethnic diversity.  This Constitution was inspired by organicist 
theories that espoused strongly centralized, integrative mechanisms tying 
together state and society.”91  It left little room for regional variation, and 
therefore precluded any notion of sovereignty, in great contrast to the 
important role sovereignty has played in Federal Indian law.   
The 1945 Constitution also established the structure of the government.  
There are six principal bodies of the Indonesian Republic: the People’s 
Consultative Assembly, the House of People’s Representatives, the 
Presidency, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Advisory Council, and the 
State Audit Board.92  The Constitution did not delineate with precision the 
roles of these six governing bodies, but it became clear under President 
Sukarno that the main governing authority was the Presidency, with the 
other bodies taking a submissive role.  Indeed, the 1945 Constitution 
“allowed the regime to consolidate the power of the president and the 
armed forces.”93  Additionally, with “a few notable exceptions, . . . the 
Constitution rejected individual protections as well as checks on the 
executive.  It created the basis for a strong presidency and conceived the 
institutional framework of the state as an organic whole with strong powers 
to control all sectors of society.”94   
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B. Republican Integrationism 
While West Papua officially became part of Indonesia after President 
Sukarno yielded power to President Suharto, Sukarno’s presidency built the 
foundation for the policies Suharto imposed upon West Papua.  Upon 
independence on August 17, 1945, “Indonesia inherited jurisdiction over 
many indigenous peoples” from the Dutch,95 and President Sukarno 
immediately “sought control of the far-flung reaches of the former Dutch 
East Indies.”96  The difficulties posed by the ethnic, cultural, and religious 
diversity of the enormous archipelago were immediately recognized.  “A 
top aide warned [Sukarno] that trying to control such culturally diverse 
peoples ‘is not going to work.  They are totally different people, totally 
different cultures.  We should have nothing to do with them.’  But Sukarno 
was determined to forge these hundreds of distinct cultures into a nation.”97  
Therefore, from the early days of Sukarno’s presidency, he “emphasized the 
building of a strong nation.”98  To this end, while Sukarno “ensconced his 
government in [J]akarta on the island of Java, [he] ruled with an iron hand 
and an eye to expansion.  One of his first targets was New Guinea.”99   
Republican integrationism also influenced Sukarno’s economic policies.  
“All revenues, except for minor taxes, were collected by the central 
government before budget allocations were redistributed to provinces and 
regencies.”100  In practice, this meant that all revenues derived from the 
outlying islands were collected in the capital, Jakarta, but very little were 
redistributed to the source islands.101  In sharp contrast to Suharto’s 
economic policies,102 under “President Sukarno, Indonesia traded with 
Western industrialized countries but sought military and economic support 
from the Communist bloc.  The Sukarno period was marked by rhetoric 
against the West and its aid.”103  Therefore, Western investment and 
economic development in the islands, including Papua, was not a major 
factor under President Sukarno, although it would later become the 
centerpiece of Suharto’s rule.104 
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In his pursuit of “building a single nation from the diverse peoples of the 
former Dutch East Indies,” Sukarno’s republican integrationism “gave way, 
over time, to assimilationist tendencies.”105  The policies of assimilation 
were particularly prevalent in social and cultural areas.  For example, “[t]he 
educational system was standardized . . . and a top-down curriculum [was] 
adopted, thereby creating an exclusive narrative of the country’s history 
meant to inculcate a sense of [a] single Indonesian nation.”106  This 
“narrative” did not include any reference to Papuan culture or 
knowledge.107   
 These early assimilationist efforts of the Indonesian educational system 
are quite comparable to those of the Indian boarding schools established 
during the Allotment and Assimilation Periods of Federal Indian law to 
“inculcate [Indian children] with American culture, language, and 
religion.”108  In Indonesia, “[c]ultural differences were acknowledged only 
with respect to artifacts that could be displayed in museums, in colorful 
dress for weddings, or as a way to promote tourism; such differences were 
not permitted to seep into the realm of politics, government, and 
administration.”109  More profoundly, “[l]ocal languages could be used only 
in the first few years of primary school in selected regions; Indonesian was 
the only language for all subsequent levels of education.”110  As history 
unfolded, Papua was not identified as one of the “selected regions” where 
local languages were retained.  West Papua, having experienced ten months 
of independence from the Dutch before being annexed by Indonesia,111 
became the forefront of resistance to assimilation.  Eventually, the 
Indonesian government responded by 
adopt[ing] assimilationist policies to strengthen integrationist 
institutions in Papua.  More so than in other regions, it imposed 
stringent restrictions on cultural expression through the 
educational system or other public forums.  Indonesian was 
decreed the sole language of education, and a national 
curriculum, with almost no local content, was imposed on 
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Papuans; even local songs were banned in some instances.  
Political expression, such as the raising of the Morning Star flag, 
was strongly repressed, as was the revival of calls for the 
integration of West Irian or for alternative political 
representation.112 
IV. Policies During the “New Order” Under President Suharto:  
“Irian Jaya” (1967–1998) 
A. Development of the Constitution 
After President Suharto assumed power in 1967, two important changes 
were made to the Constitution, both of which intensified the harm against 
West Papuans that was initiated by Sukarno’s republican integrationism.  
The first of these major changes was the adoption of a national “ideology” 
called Pancasila, which is embodied in the amended Constitution.113  
Pancasila “is comprised of five fundamental principles: the belief in one 
supreme God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, 
democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives and 
justice for all.”114  Adherence to these principles of monotheism, 
humanitarianism, national unity, representative democracy by consensus, 
and social justice profoundly affected the shape of legislation and other 
social policies toward West Papua under Suharto.115  Suharto also adopted a 
“social policy” of multiculturalism, which is termed Bhineka Tunggal Ika, 
or “Unity in Diversity.”116  While this policy sounds like an attempt to 
embrace the diversity of the archipelago, it was actually adopted to further 
promote and solidify the integrationist regime established by Sukarno.   
B. Further Centralization of Government and Political Integration 
Resistance to Suharto’s Bhineka Tunggal Ika policy was “repressed 
harshly.”117  Furthermore, “the autocratic and integrationist spirit of the 
Constitution and its unitary principles [i.e., Pancasila] guided the regime’s 
responses to regional challenges.  The Regional Law of 1974 established 
the framework for regional representation, clearly placing the provinces and 
regencies, or municipalities, under the authority of the central 
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government.”118  Indeed, instead of empowering regional leaders with a 
voice in the central government, the Regional Law of 1974 simply sent 
agents from the central government to the remote reaches of West Papua to 
ensure adherence to the integrationist policies.119  Like Sukarno, Suharto’s 
government followed “an aggressive policy of political integration and 
often . . . used force to compel acquiescence among its indigenous 
peoples.”120   
The integrationist and assimilationist policies serve as a good 
comparison to the assimilationist tendencies underlying many periods of 
Federal Indian law, especially the Reservation, Allotment, and Assimilation 
eras.  Indeed, part of North America’s “Indian problem” was the issue of 
“cultural transformation: how best to accomplish the cultural transformation 
of Indians into non-Indians.”121   
During the Allotment and Assimilation eras, “Congress authorized 
forcible assimilation measures and [the] Supreme Court created the plenary 
power doctrine to sanction these measures.”122  This was because “Congress 
increasingly adhered to the view that the Indian tribes should abandon their 
nomadic lives on the communal reservations and settle into an agrarian 
economy of privately [] owned parcels of land.”123  This shift focused on 
the “Indians’ assimilation into American society.”124  As will be 
demonstrated, many of Suharto’s specific policies toward West Papua had a 
similar assimilationist goal. 
C. Economic Development 
Upon assuming power, Suharto “viewed economic development and 
strong centrali[z]ed political control as flip sides of the same coin.”125  Like 
many post-colonial, developing nations, particularly in Southeast Asia, 
Suharto’s government sought “much of its legitimacy through its success in 
economic development.  As a result, any opposition to a government 
development project [was] seen as a direct threat to stability and 
development, and [was] met with harsh measures.”126  However, Suharto’s 
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emphasis on economic development was attractive to foreign investment.  
Indeed, Suharto’s “[p]ro-business policies and . . . [twenty]-year legacy of 
political stability . . . created a favorable environment.”127  While Suharto’s 
policies created “an environment for business investment that [was] unique 
among emerging market economies,”128 it was at the expense of indigenous 
populations, many of which lived in areas rich with natural resources, ready 
for exploitation by foreign investors.129   
In furtherance of his economic policies, Suharto “adopted as a slogan a 
‘trilogy of development’ consisting of stability, growth and equality.  The 
importance of the first element of that trilogy — stability — is apparent in 
the establishment of the ‘security approach’ to governance. . . .”130  Under 
this “security approach,” the Indonesian “military play[ed] a significant role 
in the supervision of political management of the country, including 
government operations and the execution of law.”131  
D. Suharto’s “Security Approach” 
Suharto’s reliance on the security approach is closely tied to his military 
roots.  “Soeharto came to power on the army’s coattails and the repressive 
might of the army [was] . . . the single most important factor in 
undermining potential opponents throughout his tenure.”132  Suharto relied 
upon the military “to reinforce his power and maintain cohesion within the 
archipelago,” and this “meant that the military was encouraged to 
strengthen its existing politico-military role.”133  As such, the security 
approach was the natural evolution and amplification of the integrationist 
approach initially established by Sukarno.   
Economic activities took place “within [a] . . . model of development 
which emphasize[d] stability and a security approach to governance.  The 
Indonesian military [was] accorded dwi-fungsi[,] or dual function, in which 
it [had] a social and political role in society as well as a military 
one . . . .”134  Under Suharto’s economic development policies, the military 
was “directed to ‘assist in the national development,’ and those who 
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oppose[d] national development [could] be found guilty of subversion.”135  
For indigenous populations, especially those living in regions with 
abundant natural resources, the military’s presence had devastating 
consequences.  Indeed, “the Asian Legal Resource Centre noted that the 
most significant obstacle to the effective implementation of human rights in 
[Indonesia was] fear of the military.”136 
E. Natural Resources Management 
Economic development, fueled by Indonesia’s abundant natural 
resources, has produced the policies that have been most destructive to the 
indigenous peoples of West Papua.  Indeed, as discussed below,137 the 
majority of legal actions involving the grievances of indigenous peoples in 
Indonesia are against companies engaged in the extractive industries on 
indigenous lands. 
In many ways, the policies of the Indonesian government under Suharto 
mirror another important aspect of North America’s “Indian problem”; 
namely, there was “an economic problem: how best to secure access to 
Indian resources.”138  However, in this regard, Native Americans have fared 
better under Federal Indian law policies regarding natural resources than the 
West Papuans did under the policies of Suharto.  As some scholars have 
noted, “because Soeharto opened Indonesia up to foreign investors and 
allowed them to exploit the immense natural resources of the country, 
without providing any legal protection or guarantees for the [indigenous 
peoples],” they “have suffered a range of misfortunes since . . .  [he] came 
to power.”139 
Because Suharto’s economic policies were part of a greater centralized 
regime of integrationism, regional economic disparities resulted in wealth 
moving from the resource-rich indigenous provinces to the capital city.140  
Indeed, the “capital city has consistently been the only province without 
minerals that has been among the richest in the nation.  The exploitation of 
mineral resources has made several provinces with relatively small 
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populations on the geographic periphery [including West Papua] the 
nation’s wealthiest provinces in nominal terms.”141  In both Aceh and West 
Papua, “the wealth produced per inhabitant (as measured by per capital 
gross domestic product) is among the highest in Indonesia.  But in both 
provinces income and consumption per person — which more accurately 
reflect the quality of living — fall much lower in the national rankings.”142   
Under this system, those profits derived from natural resources that did not 
accrue to the capital city went on to foreign companies, thereby resembling 
the former colonial model wherein the Dutch exploited Indonesia’s 
resources for the benefit of the Netherlands143  Therefore, “[f]rom the 
perspective of resources-rich provinces like . . . Irian Jaya . . . , the 
[Suharto] system seem[ed] like a replay of colonial times.  Their natural 
resources, according to their leaders, [were] exploited primarily to improve 
living standards at the centre.”144  
 When combined with Suharto’s security approach, which guaranteed the 
safety of foreign investments with security furnished by the military, West 
Papua’s natural resources were not only “exploited at great profit for the 
Indonesian government and foreign businesses, but at the expense of the 
Papuan peoples and their homelands.  When international companies come 
to Papua, the Indonesian military accompanies them to ‘protect’ the ‘vital 
projects.’”145  As a result, the Papuans “‘are not only fighting the military 
within the country.  [They] have come to realize that all the industrialized 
countries of the North are also hurting [them].’”146   
1. Timber Industry 
In terms of timber, indigenous people in West Papua, particularly the 
Moi Tribe, “have lost extensive lands to timber-cutting enterprises.”147  The 
Moi Tribe is “totally dependent on the forest.  But with the government’s 
sanction, [a] logging company is cutting eight hundred and thirty-seven 
thousand acres of trees in the heart of Moi ancestral lands.”148  As one Moi 
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tribesman stated, “‘[t]earing down our forest is like tearing out our 
hearts.’”149   
As compared to the policies of Federal Indian law, Native Americans 
have fared better in this area.  For example, in a 1938 decision, United 
States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, the court held that the Shoshone’s 
possessory right to the land “included the timber and mineral resources 
within the reservation.”150  The West Papuans, in contrast, have been unable 
to establish any right to the land, possessory or otherwise, let alone to its 
resources. 
2. Extractive Industries 
The most blatant abuses against the West Papuans, however, have 
resulted from the extractive industries in West Papua.  Indeed, it is difficult 
to find any discussion of West Papua that does not reference the Freeport 
McMoRan mining company’s operations in West Papua, and its decades of 
confrontations with the indigenous people of West Papua.   
The reign of Freeport in West Papua coincides with that of Suharto. “In 
1967, a year after Suharto seized power in Jakarta, a new foreign-
investment law was passed.  The first company to take advantage of the 
new opportunities was Freeport” and it has maintained its facility ever 
since.151  Freeport, headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana, is the “largest 
mining company in the world.”152  Over time, “[b]y maintaining a close 
relationship with the Suharto regime and its feared arm of repression, 
Freeport secured for itself a powerful political and economic insurance 
policy.”153   
By the 1990s, “Freeport financed Suharto’s government, his closest 
associates, and even the president into the company on exceptionally 
favorable, if not questionable, terms.”154  Freeport has also had a long-term 
relationship with the Indonesian military: “[a]round 3000 Indonesian 
soldiers and police are on guard to protect the mining facilities.”155  The 
relationship between Suharto’s government and military and Freeport has 
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had a dramatic environmental impact on the lands of the indigenous people, 
has impaired land ownership rights, and has resulted in serious human 
rights violations.  
3. Environmental Impact 
Freeport mines “the world’s largest single reserve of both copper and 
gold in the Grasberg minerals district in Papua.”156  In order to develop the 
mine site after securing rights under Suharto’s Foreign Investment Law, 
Freeport built a sixty-three mile road from the southern coast of West Papua 
to its first mine, moving twelve million tons of earth in the process.157  
Much of this development cut straight through the heart of indigenous 
lands.158  In terms of the mining operation, the company mines 
approximately 250,000 metric tons of ore per day, producing an additional 
150,000 metric tons of overburden per day as a byproduct.159  In the 
process, Freeport “is essentially grinding [an] Indonesian mountain into 
dust, skimming off the precious metals, and dumping the remainder into the 
Ajkwa River.  The pulverized rock (called ‘tailings’) has created a 
wasteland in the river valley below.  [In 1996,] . . . the company [estimated 
that it would] dump more than 40 million tons of tailings into the river 
th[at] year alone.”160 
Obviously, these activities have devastated indigenous lands.  According 
to a 1996 Dames & Moore environmental audit, which was endorsed by 
Freeport, the “mine’s tailings have already ‘severely impacted’ more than 
[eleven] square miles of rainforest, . . . [and] over the life of the mine 3.2 
billion tons of waste rock — a great part of which generates acid — will be 
dumped into the local river system.”161  Interestingly, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), a United States federal agency, had 
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insured Freeport’s mining operations in Indonesia.162  In recognition of the 
vast environmental devastation resulting from Freeport’s operations, 
however, in 1995 OPIC cancelled Freeport’s “$100 million political risk 
insurance policy. . . . Officially, OPIC’s cancellation was for environmental 
reasons, [and] according to U.S. federal law, the agency must take human 
rights and environmental and health and safety issues into consideration 
when issuing insurance.”163  However, because Freeport has operated with 
the blessing of the Indonesian government, it has not suffered any other 
repercussions — although it has been the target of increasing legal actions 
initiated in United States courts.164 
4. Land Ownership Rights 
In addition to wreaking havoc on the indigenous environment, Freeport’s 
operations have fundamentally impaired indigenous land ownership rights.  
As for Native Americans, land plays a central role in West Papuan religion 
and culture. 
Others may laugh at our customs and how we are so closely 
related to the land and all things that grow on the land. . . . But 
all the trees, animals, fish, insects, reptiles, and even mountains 
have special meaning for us.  Long before whites came here, 
these things were very sacred, because they were part of our 
well-being.165 
This sentiment is markedly similar to the Native American relationship to 
land.  Land “is the source of spiritual origins and sustaining myth[,] which 
in turn provides a landscape of cultural and emotional meaning.”166 
Freeport’s 1967 contract with the Indonesian government gave the 
company access to 10,000 hectares of indigenous Amungme tribal land in 
order to mine for copper.167  Just as environmental damage and human 
rights violations have “continued to sour relations between the company 
and the indigenous peoples[,] so too has the sensitive issue of land rights 
recognition or recognisi, for arguably the greatest loss to these peoples has 
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been spiritual.”168  This is because, similar to Native Americans, the “land 
is their mother, it is where the souls of their ancestors live, it gives them 
life.”169  In light of this, Freeport’s operations are particularly offensive: 
 
In the process of taking twenty-five million tons of copper from 
West Papua, Freeport excavated an enormous open-pit mine on 
the traditional lands of the Amungme people.  A mountain once 
held sacred has been leveled, the people have lost their 
livelihood, and effluents from the mine have polluted waters 
downstream.170   
Furthermore, when Freeport commenced its operations in West Papua, the 
Amungme Tribe’s village “was moved to make way for the company town 
[and] the Amungme graveyard was moved to build the company’s 
helipad.”171   
By 1996, Freeport exercised control over three times the amount of land 
it started with, “and the company ha[d] no policy of commitment or royalty 
distribution to the local community.”172  In 1977, the Amungme Tribe had 
unsuccessfully attempted to gain compensation from the Indonesian 
government for the land they lost to the mining operation to no avail.173  
This was due to the Indonesian government’s view of indigenous land 
ownership rights: “‘the land belongs to [the Papuans] only until the 
government needs it.  Then it belongs to the state.  This means [the 
Papuans] have no rights whatsoever.  If the government wants your land, 
you have to move.  Just like that.’”174   
This serves as a contrast to the possessory rights of Native Americans 
under Federal Indian law.  For example, in County of Oneida v. Oneida 
Indian Nation, the Oneidas were able to sue under federal common law to 
validate their possessory rights.175  The Amungme Tribe has never had such 
standing. 
Similarly, Indonesia has refused to recognize the rights of the Moi Tribe, 
whose land has been exploited extensively for timber.  Like many Native 
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American tribes, “Moi lands are ‘owned’ by clans and communities, not by 
individuals, but Indonesia refuses to recognize their land rights.”176  From 
the perspective of the Moi, they “‘are the people who [have] a right to this 
land, an absolute right.’”177 
However, the policies of Suharto’s government explicitly precluded any 
West Papuan claim to their land.  In some ways, the unilateral ability of 
Suharto’s government to assume ownership of West Papuan indigenous 
land parallels the origins of Federal Indian law.  Under the Discovery 
Doctrine in Federal Indian law, “discovery gave an exclusive right to 
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by 
conquest.”178 Similarly, when foreign investors discovered an area ripe for 
economic development in Indonesia, the Indonesian government simply 
assumed ownership of the land. 
5. Human Rights Violations 
Suharto’s aggressive pro-development policies, coupled with the unique 
power of the Indonesian military, combined to cause extensive human 
rights violations that have occurred in furtherance of economic 
development projects, such as Freeport’s mining operations.  Indeed, the 
“military presence is almost always associated with human rights violations 
such as killings, arbitrary arrests, rape and torture.  Those Papuans who 
protest against the Indonesian government, the military or ‘vital projects’ 
are even more likely to experience abuses of their human rights.”179  These 
human rights violations have been extensively documented.  In fact, in 
1999, a congressional hearing was held where Representative 
Faleomavaega of American Samoa testified about the human rights abuses.  
He reported,  
since the Indonesian government seized control of West Papua, 
the Papuans have suffered blatant human rights abuses, including 
extrajudicial executions, imprisonment, torture and, according to 
Afrim Djonbalic’s 1998 statement to the United Nations, 
“environmental degradation, natural resource exploitation, and 
commercial dominance of immigrant communities.”  Sadly, . . . 
a U.S.-based company mining copper, gold, and silver in West 
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Papua New Guinea allegedly shares in the exploitation and abuse 
of Papuan lands and its people.180 
Representative Faleomavaega also detailed Freeport’s relationship with the 
Indonesian military, which has been responsible for many of the human 
rights violations.  He stated, 
[s]pecific allegations have been made to Freeport’s direct 
association with human rights abuses undertaken by the 
Indonesian government on Freeport land.  Freeport facilities are 
policed both by Freeport security and the Indonesian military; 
Freeport feeds, houses, and provides transportation for the 
Indonesian military; and after any incidence of indigenous 
resistance against Freeport, the military responds while Freeport 
looks on.181   
Two episodes brought Freeport’s activities to the attention of some 
international organizations, including Amnesty International.  In 1977, 
Amungme villagers ejected two Indonesian policemen from their village, 
and “the Indonesian military retaliated by strafing the area on the 22nd of 
July, 1977, from two Bronko OV-IOs until they ran out of ammunition.’”182  
The local people then retaliated “by blowing up a copper slurry pipe,” and 
the military “responded with Operasi Tumpas (‘Operation Annihilation’).  
‘The Indonesian military destroyed Amungme gardens, burned down 
houses and churches, and tortured and killed men, women, and children.  
The OPM believes thousands of Me, Dani, and Amungme were killed in 
1977, although Indonesia claims it was far less, only about 900.’”183   
Later that year, “when West Papuans attacked Freeport facilities, the 
Indonesian military bombed the natives using U.S.-made Broncos.”184  
After this episode, “Amnesty International reported that the military used 
steel containers from Freeport to incarcerate indigenous people.”185  In sum, 
Suharto’s security approach, coupled with his aggressive economic policies, 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48. 
 181. Id. at H9198. 
 182. PERRY, supra note 7, at 206 (quoting David Hyndman, Melanesian Resistance to 
Ecocide and Ethnocide: Transnational Mining Projects and the Fourth World on the Island 
of New Guinea, in TRIBAL PEOPLES AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW, supra 
note 10, at 281, 286). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Statement of Del. Faleomavaega, supra note 48. 
 185. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
450 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
 
 
have resulted in tremendous human rights violations in West Papua, 
violations that occurred with the complicity of Freeport. 
6. Legal Response 
Remarkably, most of the judicial activity associated with the grievances 
of indigenous peoples in Indonesia has occurred in United States courts.  
This is due to the “inability of international environmental regulation to 
protect developing countries from the activities of [transnational 
corporations],” which “has led victims of environmental damage to seek 
redress in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (‘ATCA’).”186  
Some of Freeport’s activities have also raised questions about possible 
violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.187 To date, however, 
Freeport has evaded any such liability, even though its dealings with the 
Suharto administration have been called “questionable.”188 
In West Papua, “[a]fter years of watching the degradation of the 
environment and the human rights violations committed because of the 
Freeport presence on his lands, Beanal, with the support of NGOs and a 
private attorney from New Orleans, decided to take legal action.”189  Beanal 
v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc.190 was “the first legal action ever taken by any 
[indigenous] group or individual in Indonesia.”191   
In 1997, Beanal filed a complaint against Freeport in federal district 
court in the Eastern District of Louisiana, invoking jurisdiction based upon 
diversity of citizenship,192 the ATCA,193 and the Torture Victim Protection 
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Act of 1991.194  Beanal was the leader of the Amungme Tribal Council.195  
He alleged that 
Freeport engaged in environmental abuses, human rights 
violations, and cultural genocide.  Specifically, he alleged that 
Freeport mining operations had caused harm and injury to the 
Amungme’s environment and habitat.  He further alleged that 
Freeport engaged in cultural genocide by destroying the 
Amungme’s habitat and religious symbols, thus forcing the 
Amungme to relocate.  Finally, he asserted that Freeport’s 
private security force acted in concert with the Republic to 
violate international human rights.196   
In addition to being the first lawsuit brought on behalf of indigenous people 
in Indonesia, at the time it was also “the only environmental tort case 
brought under the ATCA.”197   
Enacted in 1789, the ATCA provides that federal “district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”198  Since plaintiffs have used the ATCA “successfully in 
international human rights cases, . . . victims of international environmental 
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abuse have attempted to use the ATCA to bring international environmental 
rights cases.”199   
Unfortunately, the district court ultimately dismissed Beanal’s case for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which was 
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.200  The dismissal was 
premised on both courts finding that “the allegations of human rights 
violations lacked specificity.  More importantly, the courts found that the 
allegations of international environmental law violations were not 
cognizable torts under the ATCA.”201   
Despite the unfavorable outcome of Beanal, several other indigenous 
groups in Indonesia have followed his lead and sought relief from 
American corporations in United States courts.  For example, in Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., Indonesian villagers in Aceh, Indonesia sued Exxon, 
alleging “that Exxon’s security forces committed murder, torture, sexual 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and other torts,” and sought relief 
under the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act.202  Similarly, in 
Papua New Guinea, villagers brought an action against the Rio Tinto 
mining group under the ATCA, claiming “that various war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, racial discrimination, and environmental torts arose out 
of Rio Tinto’s mining operations.”203  
Indigenous Indonesian litigants have also pursued other strategies.  
Yosefa Alomang, a West Papuan, brought a lawsuit against Freeport 
alleging that “Freeport has engaged in human rights violations, cultural 
genocide, and environmental violations through its corporate policies and 
conduct at the Grasberg Mine, located in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.”204  
Alomang’s claim for relief was based upon Louisiana state tort law.205  
While unsuccessful, the increasing number of cases claiming relief under 
United States law is an interesting correlation to the experience of Native 
Americans, with both groups resorting to the same courtrooms for relief.   
Litigation activity has also picked up on the domestic front in Indonesia, 
with indigenous groups resorting to local courts.  Predictably, these cases 
also target foreign corporations.  For example, in April 2005, a “criminal 
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case was lodged by the Indonesian Prosecutor’s office” against PT 
Newmont, an American mining company.  This “law suit claimed that PT 
Newmont did not have any permission to dump the tailings from its factory 
into Buyat Bay.”206  In addition, Aurora Gold, an Australian mining 
company, was sued in an Indonesian court.207 
F. Transmigration 
As discussed above, one of the Dutch colonial policies that left a lasting 
legacy on the governance of Indonesia was transmigration.208  Indonesia 
began its transmigration program under Suharto in 1969.209  The 
transmigration program was a “massive resettlement effort designed to 
move families from densely-populated Java and Bali to less crowed outer 
islands of the Indonesian archipelago where they are . . . provided with 
houses, land and other assistance to develop viable agricultural 
communities.”210  The international community supported Suharto’s 
transmigration project via the World Bank, which provided funding for 
“seven projects totaling US $560 million approved between 1976 and 
1985.”211   
Like the removal policies of Federal Indian law, Suharto’s 
transmigration program was voluntary, at least in nominal terms.  However, 
“‘[m]igrants are drawn to Papua because of money.  Papua’s low 
population, the richness of its natural resources and mild competition are 
among the pull factors of migration to the region.’”212  For this reason, 
“[w]ith more than 130 transmigration settlements in West Papua, it . . . 
became the largest recipient of migrants so that the province, which is one 
of the most sparsely populated in the archipelago, has the distinction of 
having one of the highest population growth rates of any province.”213  The 
success of Suharto’s transmigration program corresponds to a number of ill 
effects in West Papua.  
It has been widely acknowledged that “transmigration is a political rather 
than an economic tool which seeks the integration and pacification of 
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outlying regions.”214  Indeed, the transmigration program was part of the 
broader integrationist policies of both Sukarno and Suharto.  The 
transmigration program under Suharto was an “integral part of the central 
government’s policy of ‘Indonesianization’ or the creation of one kind of 
Indonesian and focused on incorporating areas resistant to Jakarta’s rule, 
such as East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua.”215  Assimilation as an official 
component of the transmigration program is evident from a 1993 statement 
of Indonesia’s former Minister of Transmigration: “‘different ethnic 
groups . . . will in the long run disappear because of integration, and there 
will be one kind of man.’”216   
Transmigration also included a range of related “[c]oercive programs to 
assimilate islanders and induce conformity with the predominant Javanese 
population, [including the] suppression of local religious practices, forced 
relocation to centralized villages, and such apparently trivial issues as 
compulsory haircuts.”217  For these reasons, Indonesia’s transmigration 
program relates to some of the foundational ideas of Federal Indian law.  
President Jefferson once wrote, “our settlements will gradually 
circumscribe and approach the Indians, and they will in time either 
incorporate with us as citizens of the United States, or remove beyond the 
Mississippi.”218  This policy statement is synonymous with the policy 
underlying Indonesia’s transmigration program. 
As the “largest recipient of migrants,”219 the assimilative policies of 
Suharto’s transmigration program have had devastating effects on West 
Papuan culture.220  The Papuans “have been made a minority in their own 
land.”221  From the West Papuan perspective, “transmigration settlements 
are an integral component of Jakarta’s integration policy designed to 
destroy the Melanesian culture.”222   
                                                                                                                 
 214. LAWYERS COMM., supra note 63, at 58. 
 215. LEITH, supra note 33, at 205. 
 216. DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 175. 
 217. PERRY, supra note 7, at 204. 
 218. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to William Henry 
Harrison, Governor of Indiana Territory (Feb. 27, 1803), available at http://www.let.rug.nl/ 
usa/presidents/thomas_jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jef151/php. 
 219. LEITH, supra note 33, at 206. 
 220. See DAVIDSON, supra note 16, at 175 (“In West Papua, transmigration supplies 
cheap immigrant labor for the logging operators, but its hidden agenda is to extend 
government control over indigenous peoples.”). 
 221. Correspondent’s Diary, supra note 21. 
 222. LEITH, supra note 33, at 218. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol37/iss2/2
No. 2] POLICIES OF INEQUITY – A WORLD APART 455 
 
 
In addition to its integrationist goals, the transmigration program has also 
“focused on ensuring a supply of cheap and readily accessible labor to 
foreign enterprises operating in the most remote regions of the 
archipelago,”223 including the extractive industries operating in West 
Papua.224  In exchange for migrating, transmigrants are guaranteed 
employment in their new home.  This has created an enormous economic 
disparity in West Papua.  
[P]oorly paid jobs . . . are filled by native Papuans while skilled 
labour and commerce seem to belong exclusively to migrants 
from elsewhere in Indonesia. . . . The sense of division is such 
that nearly all the locals use the term ‘Indonesians’ to mean 
migrants from elsewhere, as if they did not share a single 
republic.225  
This ethnic divisiveness harkens back to the divisions made along ethnic 
lines by the Dutch, as discussed above.226 
A final aspect of the transmigration program is that of relocating 
indigenous people to make room for the transmigrants, called relokasi.  
West Papuan “traditional landowners claim that from the very beginning, 
because of [Freeport’s] presence on their land, their rights have been 
violated through relokasi.”227  This is because Freeport employs many of 
the transmigrants, but not the native population, and has therefore relocated 
the Amungme Tribe to make room for its operations.228  
 The transmigration programs under Dutch colonial rule and under 
Suharto are quite comparable to the policies of the Removal Era in the 
United States.  In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act whereby 
the federal government would provide lands west of the Mississippi in 
exchange for tribes’ eastern lands, a purportedly voluntary exchange.229  
Similarly, Indonesia’s transmigration policy is voluntary for the 
transmigrants; however, the indigenous people are forcibly removed from 
their lands to make way for the transmigrant settlements.230   
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Because of the integrationist policies underlying Indonesia’s 
transmigration program, there is also a correlation to the policies during the 
Reservation Era in Federal Indian law, when the United States 
“aggressively pursued assimilation and conversion to farming by Indian 
people.”231  Finally, transmigration seems to closely parallel the policies 
underlying the Allotment and Assimilation eras of Federal Indian law, 
when “Congress authorized forcible assimilation measures and [the] 
Supreme Court created the plenary power doctrine to sanction these 
measures.”232   
G. Civil Rights 
Although the “right of political association was first established by 
Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, Article 28, which guarantees that ‘[f]reedom 
of association and assembly, of verbal and written expression and the like, 
shall be prescribed by law,’”233 Suharto’s policies severely limited civil 
rights.  This has had enormous consequences in West Papua where 
separatist sentiment has been present for decades.  For example, freedom of 
association was severely curtailed under Suharto because the “process of 
granting permits for meetings allow[ed] the government to determine who 
can or cannot speak at forums or seminars.  Under Article 510 of the 
Criminal Code, police are authorized to disband any discussion or forum 
that does not have a permit.”234  Additionally, as part of its integrationist 
policies, 
[t]he Suharto government did not like to make any distinction 
between the ethnic groups that made up the state of Indonesia; 
therefore it did not acknowledge any group as West Papuan, 
Papuan, or Melanesian, but rather as Irianese . . . . The terms 
“West Papuan,” “Papuan,” and “Melanesian” were illegal under 
Suharto, with their use being associated with the separatist 
movement . . . .235  
 Amazingly, as part of these broader policies that infringed upon civil 
rights, the hoisting of a West Papuan flag was “a matter of national 
interest,” and a “‘law making any kind of protest punishable as an act of 
subversion’” resulted in one Papuan being sentenced to twenty years in 
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prison for doing so.236  Finally, during President’s Suharto regime, 
“political leaders disappeared or were imprisoned, tortured, or executed; 
peaceful political dissent was violently crushed; and the rule of law 
remained subordinate to an all-powerful executive branch.”237 
H. Papuan Religion and Culture 
In 1993 it was written, “[i]f Indonesian policies are not changed, 
virtually all of West Papua’s tribal people will be culturally extinct within 
fifty years.”238  This is attributable to the combination of environmental 
devastation, aggressive transmigration policies, military-imposed abuse and 
control, and three decades of uncompromising integrationist policies 
developed by Sukarno and later perfected by Suharto.  This projection, 
however, did not take into account the eventual fall of Suharto’s three-
decade rule in 1998.  Since then, drastic changes have occurred, which will 
hopefully ameliorate the endangerment of West Papuan tribes. 239 
As an example of the degree of interference with West Papuan culture in 
the name of assimilation, “[b]eginning in 1971, the Indonesian government 
implemented a ‘humanitarian’ project called Operation Koteka in the 
interior regions of Irian Jaya.”240  This movement aimed “to end the 
wearing of the koteka penis sheath.”241  The koteka is worn by the males of 
many West Papuan tribes as a central part of their tribal identity, and is also 
used in ceremonies.  In response to Operation Koteka, “[f]oreign critics 
perceived the programme to be one of political and cultural 
indoctrination.”242   
In addition to implementing official state policies aimed at assimilating 
the tribes of West Papua, such as Operation Koteka, many critics have 
described Indonesia’s policies as genocidal.  At the 1999 congressional 
hearing, Representative Faleomavaega reported that 
the native Papuan people have suffered under one of the most 
repressive and unjust systems of colonial occupation in the 20th 
century. . . . [T]he Indonesian military has been brutal in West 
Papua New Guinea.  Reports estimate that between 100,000 to 
200,000 West Papuans have died or simply vanished at the hands 
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of the Indonesian military.  While we search for justice and 
peace in East Timor, . . . we should not forget the violent tragedy 
that continues to play out today in West Papua New Guinea.243   
 Because of the deaths, cultural assimilation, and dilution of tribal 
populations associated with transmigration, many West Papuans have 
resorted to flight.  As of 2005, there were “approximately 2460 West 
Papuan refugees living at East Awin” in the nation of Papua New 
Guinea.244  The refugee situation caused by West Papuans crossing the 
border from West Papua, Indonesia, to Papua New Guinea has prompted a 
response by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.245 
V. Policies During the Post-Revolution, “Special Autonomy” Era: 
“West Papua” (1998–Present) 
A. Reform Era and Constitutional Developments 
After several weeks of social unrest, on May 21, 1998, President Suharto 
resigned and his Vice-President, B.J. Habibie, became his successor in 
accordance with the Indonesian Constitution.  Even as an interim president, 
President Habibie immediately “opened the door to political reform . . . , 
eased constraints on the press and released political prisoners.”246  At the 
time he took office, there were so many economic, political, and social 
problems in Indonesia that by 2002, one observer noted, “Indonesia is 
entering the fifth year of its post-Suharto ‘Reform Era,’ but the nation-state 
seems to be pulling itself apart at the seams.”247 
The “Reform Era” has been characterized by a tension between two 
polarized predispositions, described by one scholar as “a double movement 
of reference.”248  Under this view, 
[o]ne direction is inward, towards indigenousness, authenticity, 
and Indonesian values, in an effort to find local points of support 
in the face of global moral corruption.  The other direction is 
outward, towards universality, modernity, and transcultural 
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values of social equality, in the hopes that these values may help 
overcome local injustices.249 
This tension is also reflected in the struggle for indigenous rights in West 
Papua, which “can be divided into two components: the internal struggle for 
self-identification, and concomitantly the struggle against external forces, 
including state and multinational corporations, which have violated the 
rights of [indigenous peoples].”250   
Despite the uncertainty of the post-Suharto economic and political 
environment, “the institutional changes after 1998 have been near-
revolutionary.”251  Most importantly, the 1945 Constitution was amended 
“and new laws were passed to democratize Indonesia’s political system.”252  
More specifically, the “Constitution of 1945 was preserved but amended to 
include several provisions that allow for regional differences and autonomy.  
Regional units . . . are now accorded wide-ranging autonomy in all spheres 
except those that, by law, were specified as within the jurisdiction of the 
central government.”253  For West Papua, these changes have beckoned a 
new era of reform and self-realization. 
B. Separatism 
 As discussed, separatism emerged in West Papua during the final days of 
colonial control “when the Dutch stepped up economic and political 
development to thwart Indonesia’s attempt to gain outside support for their 
cause by increasing the perception of West Irian as a viable independent 
state.”254  Over the next thirty years, the OPM “carried out sporadic actions 
both in Irian Jaya and abroad, to express their resistance to the Indonesian 
rule.”255   
 After he came to power, “Irianese leaders living in Jakarta called on 
President B.J. Habibie to grant immediate autonomy to their home province 
and accused the central government of failing to bring prosperity to their 
territory.”256  They also “demanded a change in the name of their province 
to West Papua.”257  Given these pressing issues, the new administration 
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focused on efforts “to quell [the separatist] movements by granting limited 
regional autonomy.”258  These efforts have met with mixed success. 
 Although it has only been fifteen years since the fall of Suharto, the 
“post-Suharto government has been unable to reconcile the Papuans’ desire 
for independence with its vision of a unified Indonesia.”259  For example, 
when President Habibie “met with a delegation of 100 provincial 
representatives . . .  in February 1999 to launch a ‘National Dialogue’ 
regarding Papuan autonomy, the delegation declared its desire for 
independence.”260  The response to this “clear call for independence” was 
“to ban all discussion or dissemination of information on independence or 
autonomy,”261 harkening back to Suharto’s strict limitations on freedom of 
speech and assembly.  The activist group Human Rights Watch “decried the 
Order as calling for ‘systemic violations of free expression, assembly, and 
association rights.’”262 
By the year 2000, there were at least six instances where “police broke 
up peaceful demonstrations in which Papuans raised the Papuan 
independence flag and, after demonstrators resisted, killed, and injured 
many demonstrators.”263  By this time, President Wahid, the first elected 
president after Suharto, was in power.  As a token gesture, “Wahid 
suggested that Irian Jaya should be renamed Papua in deference to local 
sentiment.”264  The Indonesian Parliament ratified Wahid’s suggestion 
through the Special Autonomy Bill for Papua, discussed below, which 
became effective in 2001.265  Despite this improvement, Wahid later 
declared, “because the Morning Star flag was a separatist symbol, Papuans 
would need to find ‘another cultural symbol.’  After Wahid’s 
announcement, the military engaged in ‘periodic and often violent raids . . . 
on gatherings where independence symbols [were] on display.’”266 
In the early 2000s, “intra-state separatist and ethnic . . . conflicts [had] 
given rise to grave and pressing human rights and humanitarian 
                                                                                                                 
 258. Li-ann Thio, Battling Balkanization: Regional Approaches Toward Minority 
Protection Beyond Europe, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 409, 418 (2002). 
 259. Dufseth, supra note 20, at 624. 
 260. Id. at 624–25. 
 261. Id. at 625. 
 262. Id. (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 16–17). 
 263. Id. at 626. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Glazebrook, supra note 19, at 206. 
 266. Dufseth, supra note 20, at 626 (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, VIOLENCE AND 
POLITICAL IMPASSE IN PAPUA 10–11, 22 (2001)). 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol37/iss2/2
No. 2] POLICIES OF INEQUITY – A WORLD APART 461 
 
 
problems.”267  In 2003, the “Indonesian government renewed its warning to 
Papuan separatists that harsher measures by security forces would ensue 
should they continue their secessionist movement.”268  Despite this 
violence, the new administrations have attempted to subdue separatist 
activity through the enactment of new laws granting more autonomy to 
West Papua. 
C. “Special Autonomy” Status 
In addition to the constitutional amendment “to recognize regional 
differences and enshrine principles of autonomy,” new laws were enacted 
that “created autonomous regions”; in particular, “[s]pecial autonomy laws 
were passed to accommodate the demands of Aceh and Papua.”269  When 
the “Special Autonomy” Law was initially passed in 1999 under President 
Habibie, its effect remained unclear.270  Indeed, “the widespread powers 
[the laws] purport to leave to the Central Government and the broad 
wording used to describe these powers could effectively reduce 
significantly the powers left to the regions.”271  It was also “entirely 
uncertain . . . how the Central Government intend[ed] to transfer to the 
regions the funds, the personnel, the equipment, and the infrastructures that 
the regions [would] need to exercise their newly transferred powers.”272   
While these new laws “represent a significant departure from the 
authoritarian policies of the New Order,”273 some critics also feel that they 
“fail to accommodate the political aspirations of parties advocating for 
independence, even when they do so peacefully.”274  The shortcomings in 
the new legislation are also “compounded by the executive’s ready resort to 
military force to suppress both peaceful and armed pro-independence 
activists.  The bloodshed in Aceh and Papua has gathered international 
attention and disdain.”275  This overreliance on the military is a lasting 
vestige of Suharto’s administration.   
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By 2001, however, a more specific Special Autonomy Law was enacted 
that addressed the West Papuan concern over natural resources.  Under the 
new law, “Papua will receive up to 80% of the revenue from natural 
resources[,] forestry and fishery[,] and 70% from oil, gas and mining.”276  
This addresses a major concern for the West Papuans, but success in its 
implementation has yet to be realized.   
This same law, moreover, “also allows the province to use its own flag, 
anthem and change its name from Irian Jaya to Papua, which are important 
symbols of a people’s identity.”277  Therefore, despite its shortcomings, the 
new Special Autonomy Law grants some power to the West Papuans.  It 
has “granted autonomy at the provincial level, whereby the Papuan 
government obtained jurisdiction over all matters except foreign policy, 
defense, monetary and fiscal policy, religion, and justice.”278  While the full 
effect of these laws has yet to come to fruition, the West Papuans have 
minimally gained a voice in their governance and their voice has been 
heard. “[T]he 2001 Special Autonomy Law for Papua appears to be a 
genuine effort to accommodate Papuan demands.”279 
While it is too soon to fully evaluate West Papua’s Special Autonomy 
status, parallels can be drawn to the Indian New Deal era in Federal Indian 
law when, “[f]or the first time, assimilation was not the goal of Ffederal 
Indian services.  Rather, tribal culture and organization were to be 
preserved while providing Indians with the tools to achieve economically 
and culturally.”280  One of the tools provided to West Papua in furtherance 
of autonomy is a variety of new political institutions for self-governance. 
D. Political Institutions 
In addition to providing “many new areas of local authority, substantial 
fiscal resources, [and] much greater control over the region’s natural 
resources,”281 the 2001 Special Autonomy Law also created new political 
institutions in Papua.282  This included the creation of the Papuan People’s 
Representative Assembly, a legislative body representing all of the people 
of West Papua.283  A second institution, the Papuan People’s Assembly, 
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was formed “to represent indigenous Papuan groups” and “included local 
customary groups, as well as religious and women’s groups.”284  The new 
Assembly “was given the mandate of promoting and protecting the rights 
and customs of Papuan people and [was] endowed with the powers of 
consultation and assent regarding both candidates for the position of 
governor and decisions and regulations relating to the basic rights of 
Papuans.”285 
 While these institutions are still in their infancy, they represent an 
important change in the policies of Indonesia toward the indigenous people 
of West Papua.  These changes also represent a shift from Indonesia’s 
former “strong unitarist approach” to “a quasi-federal form, while resisting 
any tendency toward a pluralist federation.”286  Because this shift is still 
evolving, it remains to be seen just how much West Papua will gain through 
this transition. 
E. Land Ownership and Natural Resources Management  
While the full extent of reform in Indonesia is still unclear, the Special 
Autonomy Law for West Papua has addressed the natural resources issues 
discussed above.287  However, because “Papua is so heavily endowed with 
mineral wealth, . . . Indonesia seems unlikely ever to loosen its grip,”288 
despite the language and purpose of the new laws.  Additionally, in 
response to worldwide condemnation of its questionable environmental and 
social policies, Freeport has undertaken a variety of “community 
development” initiatives and in some ways has remained a constant during 
the tumultuous period after the fall of Suharto, with its rapid succession of 
new presidents.289  Indeed, “in the continuing absence of a responsible 
government, the company will reluctantly continue in the role of de facto 
administrator and developer around its concession area.”290   
Through its “community development program,” Freeport “provides 
much needed public health and medical programs for the area.”291  
Additionally, Freeport runs an education program “which involves building 
schools, dormitories, and vocational training centers; teaching literacy; 
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supplying uniforms; supporting teachers in local villages and offering 
scholarships.”292  Strangely, the fact that Freeport is now serving as a quasi-
government in the area strengthens the analogy to the origins of the Dutch 
nationalized colony, which began as the commercial enterprise of the Dutch 
East India Company.293   
On the other hand, Freeport no longer has a steadfast ally after the fall of 
Suharto. “For more than thirty years Freeport was feted by the Suharto 
regime and was politically significant in Indonesia.  Today Suharto’s 
successors vilify the company for political expediency.  While Freeport 
knew how to protect itself under Suharto, it is struggling in this new 
political climate.”294  The resulting combination of the new Indonesian 
government’s mistrust of Freeport and Freeport’s new role as a quasi-
governmental body in West Papua remains unclear. 
Although it is too soon to judge, perhaps West Papua’s new Special 
Autonomy status will come to mimic the current era in Federal Indian law, 
the Self-Determination Era, where “[n]ative nations are pursuing economic 
development in order to have the freedom to control their own political, 
cultural and social destinies and to have the ability to sustain communities 
where their citizens can and want to live.”295  Like this era in Federal Indian 
law, it will be decades before we can evaluate whether West Papua’s new 
status will be an effective means to meet these goals. 
VI. Conclusion 
In the almost five decades it has controlled the province, the Republic of 
Indonesia has undergone a series of rapid changes in its policies toward the 
indigenous people of West Papua.  The majority of this period fell under 
Suharto’s rule, and many of Suharto’s policies mirrored those of Federal 
Indian law.  Most profoundly, the strong integrationist policy instigated by 
Sukarno, and furthered by Suharto, is congruent to the assimilationist 
tendencies during the Reservation, Allotment, and Assimilation eras of 
Federal Indian law.  Similarly, the Removal era of Federal Indian law 
shares core underlying policies with the transmigration program under 
Suharto.  Additionally, most of the case law involving indigenous people in 
Indonesia involves issues surrounding the exploitation of natural resources 
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and land ownership rights, which is also a strong current in Federal Indian 
law.  Ironically, many of the more abusive policies leading to these cases 
involve American corporations, which have been complicit in the 
oppression of West Papuans. 
 While the picture was grim under Sukarno and Suharto, recent 
developments in the fifteen years since Suharto’s fall from power have 
rapidly changed the policies of Indonesia toward the West Papuans.  These 
new policies, which grant West Papuans increased autonomy and finally 
recognize the value of their culture, after decades of forced assimilation, are 
still too new to evaluate.  It is possible, however, that the West Papuans 
may gain independence due to the momentum of a sixty-year separatist 
movement, the concerns of which are finally being heard as evidenced 
through the enactment of the Special Autonomy Laws.  If West Papua is 
able to move toward independence and harness its enormous natural 
resources wealth, it may eventually stand in a better position than many of 
the tribes in North America, which are facing diminishing tribal sovereignty 
and increasing state encroachment. 
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